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The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in O’Shane v Harbour 
Radio exposes various issues involved in a judicial officer’s suit for 
defamation, including the challenges faced by defendants in raising the 
defence of truth. While the majority found that Magistrate O’Shane was 
not barred from bringing a defamation claim against Alan Jones, the 
minority held it should be disallowed because of public policy reasons.  
This paper proposes that the policy reasons in favour of barring judicial 
defamation suits can potentially be invoked to establish a novel concept 
of ‘judicial reputation’, borrowing from existing jurisprudence in relation 
to ‘governmental reputation’. Applied here, a plaintiff should not have 
capacity to sue in defamation in order to protect their judicial reputation, 
because this type of reputation is incompatible with democratic 
principles of freedom of speech. Having regard to the unique position 
judicial officers are in, in that they effectively embody the court, and the 
public nature of the defendant’s wrong in publishing words criticising 
them, it can be said that a personal suit to protect judicial reputation is 
incongruous with defamation law.  
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An awkward situation: The 
courts’ approach to a judicial 
officer suing for defamation 
       Aarushi Sahore* 
Introduction 
The prospect of a judicial officer suing a member of the public for defamation is 
‘unseemly’,1 and acknowledged to give rise to ‘awkward situations’.2 Nonetheless 
judicial officers have so sued, and the recent New South Wales Court of Appeal 
judgment in O’Shane v Harbour Radio3 (‘O’Shane’) demonstrates that the issues 
arising in such proceedings are far from resolved. In O’Shane a bare majority 
determined that former magistrate Patricia O’Shane was not barred from bringing a 
defamation suit against radio show host Alan Jones for criticising her decision-
making as ‘diabolically bad’. In contrast the minority found that, as a matter of 
principle, judges could not sue to protect their reputation in respect of their judicial 
capacity and conduct.  
This paper considers whether and to what extent a judicial officer should have 
capacity to sue for defamation in order to protect his or her professional reputation. 
There is no clear rule of law prohibiting judicial defamation claims, as per the 
outcome of O’Shane, but wherever the issue has arisen there has been a persistent 
                                            
* University of Sydney Law School, 2014. I am grateful for the feedback and advice of 
my supervisor, Associate Professor David Rolph. 
1 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 236, 271. 
2 Kim Gould, 'When the judiciary is defamed: Restraint policy under challenge' (2006) 
80 Australian Law Journal 602, 605, 611, 613, 615. 
3 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314. 
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and principled view that such claims should not be allowed. It is submitted that one 
way of resolving this is through the concept of a ‘judicial reputation’ which cannot be 
the subject of a defamation claim. The idea of a judicial reputation that cannot be 
protected by defamation, just as the governmental reputation of a local council 
cannot be protected by defamation, has not been adverted to in earlier cases or 
commentary. This proposal, however, attempts to incorporate the various public 
policy considerations that have been previously raised. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that generally judges, particularly those 
sitting in more senior courts, rarely sue for defamation.4 That there are very few 
precedents is most probably attributable to reluctance on the part of judicial officers 
in becoming plaintiffs in their own or other courts. Asking another judge, whether or 
not more senior or junior, or a jury to determine judicial capacity may be 
embarrassing. In addition, the prospect of losing such a claim in the public eye could 
render the judge’s continued service untenable. It might be said, therefore, that the 
issue ‘scarcely cries out for an exceptional solution.’5 This paper, however, reflects 
on the various and complex issues emerging from the few examples that have 
arisen. It attempts to analyse existing views, mostly expressed in the form of public 
policy or public interests, in order to pull together an explanation for why there is such 
unease in relation to judicial defamation claims. Finally it proposes a way of 
incorporating existing reasoning into a legal rule prohibiting such suits. 
Chapter I provides a detailed consideration of the judgment in O’Shane. First, the 
factual background and appeal questions are outlined. Secondly, the few previous 
instances of judicial consideration of the issue are discussed. Thirdly, the majority as 
                                            
4 R v Hoser [2001] VSC 443, [229]-[230] (Eames J); Enid Campbell and H P Lee, 
'Criticism of judges and freedom of expression' (2003) 8(2) Media and Arts Law 
Review 77, 86. 
5 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 242 (Kirby J). 
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well as dissenting judgments in O’Shane are analysed. Finally, Chapter I concludes 
with commentary on the issues left unresolved.  
Chapter II presents a possible solution to the unresolved issues emerging in 
O’Shane, namely through the concept of judicial reputation. This chapter first outlines 
the jurisprudence concerning the concept of governmental reputation which cannot 
be the subject of a defamation claim. Then, similar reasoning is applied to suggest 
that a plaintiff should have no capacity to sue in defamation to protect his or her 
judicial reputation. In particular freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary is 
considered, and it is submitted that this freedom should be protected. The public 
nature of the judge’s role and the public nature of the defendant’s wrong are then 
explored to justify this outcome. Finally, the possibilities and limitations of judicial 
reputation as a proposal are considered.  
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I. O’Shane v Harbour Radio 
O’Shane is the most recent and extensive examination of issues arising in a judicial 
officer’s suit for defamation in respect of disparaging comments about their judicial 
conduct and capacity. In this case former Magistrate Patricia O’Shane sued well-
known radio broadcaster Alan Jones for stating on morning radio that she, among 
other things, made ‘diabolically bad decisions’. The New South Wales Court of 
Appeal’s judgment explores a number of interesting legal issues, most relevantly for 
this paper whether a judicial officer should be able to sue for defamation at all. This 
issue divided the court 3:2.  
First, this chapter outlines the facts and background to the five questions removed to 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal by McCallum J. Secondly, it canvasses 
previous judicial consideration of the question of whether a judicial officer is entitled 
to sue for defamation. Thirdly, it summarises the decision on appeal, which consisted 
of five separate judgments. Finally, it identifies the areas of ambiguity that build the 
foundation for Chapter II. 
Background to the appeal 
In 2011 the Judicial Commission of New South Wales was investigating complaints 
made against Magistrate Brian Maloney for inappropriate comments and behaviour 
on the bench.6 This investigation commenced some months after a similar inquiry 
into Magistrate Jennifer Betts, which was also prompted by complaints regarding her 
conduct on the bench towards litigants, and ultimately resulted in an unsuccessful 
                                            
6 Michael Campbell, Jane Mottley and Martha Jabour, 'Report of the Conduct Division 
to the Governor Regarding Complaints Against His Honour Magistrate Maloney' 
(Report No 2, Judicial Commission of New South Wales Conduct Division, 11 May 
2011). 
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motion before Parliament for her dismissal.7 Around this time there was significant 
media commentary on both cases.8  
It was within this context that Alan Jones expressed his views on the investigation 
into Magistrate Maloney. On his breakfast show on 2GB Radio, Jones defended 
Maloney as a ‘good man, fighting for his professional life.’ Jones observed that, while 
Maloney had disposed of thousands of cases in fifteen years on the bench, there 
were only four complaints made against him. Turning his attention to Magistrate 
O’Shane, Jones stated: 
My understanding is the complaints [against Maloney] are in respect to what 
are said to be inappropriate comments. My understanding is there's no 
reference to any wrong decisions based on law. But here's the rub. Pat 
O'Shane can deliver the most diabolical and wrong decisions in law, and they 
go through to the keeper, Pat O'Shane. 
Similar statements were made in the following week on the same radio show. On 24 
November 2011 O’Shane commenced defamation proceedings against Jones and 
the radio station operator, Harbour Radio Pty Ltd. The first instance proceedings 
were before McCallum J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. O’Shane 
pleaded that the radio broadcast conveyed, among other things, that she had ‘failed 
                                            
7 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, (Legislative Council), 16 June 2011, 
2496.  
8 Alexandra Smith, 'Betts wins the right to stay on the bench', Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 17 June 2011  <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/betts-wins-the-right-to-stay-on-
the-bench-20110616-1g680.html>; Richard Ackland, 'High time to put an end to 
clubby protection', Sydney Morning Herald (online), 17 June 2011  
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/high-time-to-put-an-end-to-
clubby-protection-20110616-1g5sw.html>; Geoff Chambers, 'Judge Jennifer Betts' 
plea to keep her position', The Daily Telegraph (online), 16 June 2011  
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/judge-jennifer-betts-plea-to-keep-her-
position/story-e6freuzi-1226075952996>; Kate Sikora, 'Magistrate Brian Maloney's 
new strife', The Daily Telegraph (online), 23 June 2011  
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/magistrate-brian-maloneys-new-
strife/story-e6freuzi-1226080217846>; Leo Shanahan, 'Complaints piling up on 
bipolar magistrate', The Australia (online), 23 June 2011  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/complaints-piling-up-on-
bipolar-magistrate/story-e6frg97x-1226080205592>. 
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in her duties as a Magistrate by delivering diabolically bad decisions’ and ‘failed in 
her duty as a Magistrate by delivering decisions which are wrong in law’. In response 
the defendants raised the defence of justification, 9  seeking to prove that each 
imputation was substantially true and therefore not defamatory. 
This was, to the author’s knowledge, the first time that a defendant attempted to 
prove the substantial truth of imputations concerning judicial conduct and capacity. In 
order to defend Jones’ comments, the defendants needed to prove, for example, that 
it was substantially true to say the plaintiff failed in her duty as a magistrate by 
delivering diabolically bad decisions. They proposed to do so by attacking the 
plaintiff’s judicial reasoning in earlier local court criminal decisions. This was an 
interesting strategy. As a matter of evidence law a judge is not compellable to give 
evidence,10 and cannot give evidence of their reasons except as stated on the record 
of judgment.11 Furthermore judgments cannot be tendered to prove the truth of any 
fact in issue in those proceedings.12 It appears that if a defendant seeks to prove the 
truth of statements strongly criticising a judge’s reasoning, they will generally need to 
resort to attacking the plaintiff’s reasoning in earlier decisions.  
The defendants provided particulars of the defence of truth by relying on nine 
decisions delivered by the plaintiff between 1991 and 2012. Of the nine decisions 
relied on by the defendants, seven had been successfully appealed in the Supreme 
Court13 and the defendants indicated they would ‘adopt the reasoning’ of the appeal 
                                            
9 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25. 
10 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 16. 
11 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 129.  
12 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 91. 
13 Peters v Asplund [2008] NSWSC 1061; DPP (NSW) v Elskaf [2012] NSWSC 21; 
DPP v Lee [2006] NSWSC 270; DPP v Neamati [2007] NSWSC 746; DPP v Yeo 
[2008] NSWSC 953; DPP (NSW) v Wililo [2012] NSWSC 713; McCormack v 
Langham (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Studdert J, 9 September 
1991). 
9 
judgments to criticise the plaintiff’s decisions at first instance.14 Some of the decisions 
the defendants relied on had formed the subject of media coverage and criticism.15 
The appeal decisions overturning the plaintiff’s judgments had clearly found errors of 
law. In DPP v Yeo for example the plaintiff had dismissed a charge against a 
defendant who had entered a plea of guilty. On appeal, Johnson J held the 
magistrate’s conduct of the proceedings ‘bore little resemblance to what was required 
by law’16 and ordered that the matter be reheard by a different magistrate.  
The two decisions that had not been appealed, that is, DPP v Kanaan and Berlei 
Bras, were attacked by the defendants on the basis of misconduct or inappropriate 
conduct. In Berlei Bras four women had pleaded guilty to maliciously damaging a 
billboard advertising Berlei Bras. The plaintiff did not record a conviction, stating in 
the course of her reasons that the erection of the billboard was the ‘real crime’ and 
that those accused of defacing it were ‘not misguided in their actions’.17 
The plaintiff objected to the defendants’ proposed defence of truth. By way of notice 
of motion the plaintiff applied to strike out18 the defence of truth, arguing that the 
defendants’ pleading of the defence infringed the principle of judicial immunity or was 
otherwise an abuse of process. The strike out application was initially made when the 
                                            
14 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 319 [11], 340 [115], 354 
[177]. 
15 Paul Bibby, 'O'Shane judged wanting by a higher court', Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 4 February 2012  <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/oshane-judged-wanting-by-
a-higher-court-20120203-1qxn6.html>; Peter Bodkin, 'Appeal quashes O'Shane 
decision to dismiss assault charge against Kasian Wililo', The Daily Telegraph 
(online), 30 June 2012  <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/appeal-quashes-oshane-
decision-to-dismiss-assault-charge-against-kasian-wililo/story-e6freuy9-
1226412725983>; Australian Associated Press, 'Magistrate Pat O'Shane not 
impartial, hearing told', The Australian (online), 18 December 2012  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/magistrate-pat-oshane-not-impartial-
hearing-told/story-e6frg6nf-1226539679872>. 
16 DPP v Yeo [2008] NSWSC 953, [39]. 
17 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 323 [33], 353-354 [176].  
18 Uniform Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 14.28. 
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defendants proposed to prove that the seven appeal judgments overturning the 
plaintiff’s decisions were correct. If that was the case the plaintiff contended that this 
amounted to a form of impermissible re-litigation.19  
McCallum J removed to the Court of Appeal four questions. 20  The first three 
questions concerned whether the defence of truth could be pleaded in a manner that 
criticised the plaintiff’s judgments, or whether such a defence was precluded by the 
principles of judicial immunity or finality. The questions were summarised in the 
judgment of Beazley P as follows: 
A. Are the defendants precluded by the principle of judicial immunity from 
pleading their defence of truth?  
B. If Question A is answered in the affirmative, what is the consequence for 
these proceedings? 
C. Does the defendants' defence of truth constitute an abuse of process on the 
basis that it is inconsistent with the principle of finality? 21 
As a starting point, judicial immunity is the proposition that a judge is immune from 
suit.22 Finality is the principle that controversies are resolved once and for all by the 
judicial system, which is reflected in abuse of process measures such as issue 
estoppel and res judicata.23 It is clear from the questions referred by McCallum J that 
the application of judicial immunity, or finality, to the attempt of a defendant in 
defamation to prove that the judgments of a judicial officer were incorrectly decided is 
unchartered territory.  
                                            
19 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 321 [20]. 
20 Uniform Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 1.21. 
21 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 325 [40]. 
22 Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166, 185 (Gleeson CJ); Rajski v Powell 
(1987) 11 NSWLR 522, 527, 538.  
23 D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 17. 
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As Question B indicates, there is no clear precedent on how the matter would be 
resolved if the defendants were denied the ability to rely on the defence of truth 
because of judicial immunity or finality. McCallum J therefore also referred the 
question of whether judicial immunity, if it had the effect of striking out the defence of 
truth, infringed the implied freedom of political communication as established in 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation24 (‘Lange’): 
D. Is the principle of judicial immunity consistent with the implied freedom of 
political communication guaranteed by the Australian Constitution? 25 
The defendants did not raise the implied freedom of political communication directly 
by way of defence to the plaintiff’s claim. That could have been done in the form of 
an extended Lange qualified privilege defence. This was most likely not raised 
because the implied freedom of speech is based on representative democracy and 
an informed electoral vote.26 Previous consideration indicates that communications 
concerning the judiciary are regarded as outside the scope of the implied freedom,27 
even if the judiciary is the third arm of government. Despite the way in which the 
appeal question was framed, that is by arguing that if judicial immunity defeated the 
defence of truth it infringed freedom of political speech, rather than raising the 
privilege as a defence itself, it was still in issue whether this freedom applied to 
communications criticising the judiciary. 
Troughton v McIntosh and previous judicial consideration 
So far the difficulties in this case had arisen in relation to the defence of truth and 
how it was to be pleaded. Before the appeal hearing the defendants raised a 
                                            
24 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
25 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 325 [40]. 
26 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559-560. 
27 The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1; APLA Limited v Legal 
Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322. 
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preliminary matter, which formed the fifth question on appeal. Relying on the 1896 
decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Troughton v 
Mcintosh28 (‘Troughton’) the defendants argued the plaintiff ought to be barred from 
bringing the claim in the first place. In Troughton the majority of the Full Court held 
that a police magistrate had no personal action in defamation against a former litigant 
for defamatory statements made in court. The fifth question on appeal was therefore: 
E. Is the plaintiff barred from bringing defamation proceedings with respect to 
criticism of the performance of her function as a magistrate, having regard to 
the decision in Troughton v McIntosh?29 
The defendant in Troughton had made defamatory comments in court about the 
plaintiff magistrate after losing four of five appeals before him in respect of rates 
payable on property. A few days earlier the defendant had complained about the 
magistrate in a public meeting, and before leaving the court said, ‘if I had not made 
those remarks at the meeting the other night my rates would have been reduced’, 
implying that the magistrate was corrupt. When ordered to leave the court he said, ‘it 
is not justice’ or ‘there is no justice here’.  
The majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court (Stephen and Cohen JJ, 
Simpson J dissenting) held that there was no personal action available to the 
magistrate. The ratio of this case is not easily discernable, because the judgment 
includes commentary by the majority, not forming binding precedent, about the 
inappropriateness of the claim. The ambiguities are reflected in the different ways the 
case has been interpreted by subsequent authorities. It is worth now to consider in 
                                            
28 Troughton v McIntosh (1896) 17 NSWR(L) 334. 
29 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 325 [40]. 
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some detail the reasoning of Troughton, and subsequent reference to it in the High 
Court case of Mann v O’Neill.30 
To begin with, the majority judges in Troughton acknowledged that there was 
effectively no precedent of a judge suing for defamation,31 which was probably 
attributable to, in Stephen J’s words, a ‘presumed reluctance’ to sue. Secondly, 
Stephen J’s judgment turned on the characterisation of the allegedly defamatory 
statement as a contempt of court: any aspersion on the integrity of a judge was 
described as ‘a libel on the administration of justice’ such that ‘the personal wrong is 
… absorbed in the offence against the public, nay more, against the sovereign whom 
the Judge represents’.32 Stephen J thus objected to the availability of a ‘dual remedy’, 
that is, one to satisfy the public interest through contempt of court proceedings and 
another for personal reparations to the judge by way of defamation.33 Cohen J 
similarly had regard to the simultaneously public and private nature of the issue. He 
noted that an insult to the court in the presence of the court is a public wrong, not 
conferring upon the judge or magistrate any private right to damages.34 
Stephen J’s judgment is confined to the factual scenario where the statement was 
made while court was sitting. He acknowledged, however, that the reasons of policy 
prohibiting claims against former litigants applied equally to slanders occurring 
outside the confines of the courtroom and to libels by print publications. Stephen J 
left open the possibility that a dual remedy could be available in such cases.35 Cohen 
J’s judgment went further, mentioning that lower court judges ought not sue on 
                                            
30 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204. 
31 Troughton v McIntosh (1896) 17 NSWR(L) 334, 337, 339-340 (Stephen J), 356 
(Cohen J).  
32 Ibid 337-338. 
33 Ibid 337-338, 339. 
34 Ibid 356. 
35 Ibid 341. 
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defamatory words in respect of their judicial or magisterial functions, even if those 
words are uttered outside court.36 
Finally, in respect of absolute privilege, the court had heard submissions concerning 
whether the privilege afforded to witnesses and parties in court proceedings would 
extend to the comments made by the defendant after his matter had concluded.37 
Stephen J dismissed the defendant’s arguments and concluded that whatever 
privilege counsel, witnesses or parties had in respect of defamatory words ‘none can 
extend to… accusing the sitting tribunal of injustice.’ 38  Instead, these words 
amounted to contempt of court. Cohen J, on the other hand, accepted the 
defendant’s submissions about absolute privilege and concluded that the defendant’s 
statements were still protected since they were spoken immediately after his matter 
was heard.39 
Simpson J, who was in dissent and would have allowed the claim, agreed with 
Stephen J that absolute immunity could not be claimed and also framed the 
remaining question as whether the action was maintainable.40 In his dissent Simpson 
J noted that the plaintiff, as a lower court Magistrate, would not have the power to 
bring contempt proceedings.41 He acknowledged the public policy reasons advanced 
by Stephen J to preclude such claims, but found that they were insufficient to justify 
the conclusion that the action was not maintainable.42  
What is apparent from Troughton is that, even in this much earlier judgment, it is very 
difficult to articulate why a judge ought not sue for defamation, even if there are policy 
                                            
36 Ibid 358-359. 
37 Ibid 336.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 363. 
40 Ibid 346. 
41 Ibid 346-347. 
42 Ibid 351. 
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reasons why the claim might not be brought. The majority judgment might be 
understood as saying that there is no private remedy for defamation if the statement 
amounts to contempt of court. It might also be understood as articulating a general 
rule prohibiting judges from bringing claims in defamation, at least against former 
litigants.  
It is clear that difficulties exist because the defendant’s comments were not merely 
criticisms against an ordinary person in their professional capacity. The defendant’s 
comments cast aspersions against the judge personally, but at the same time 
amounted to criticisms of the court itself. Troughton therefore implicitly acknowledges 
that it is difficult to draw the line between the reputation of a judge as an individual 
professional, and the reputation or authority of the court as an institution. This 
overlap is why the defendant’s comment might have been pursued as contempt of 
court in addition to defamation.  
Troughton was only next considered in Mann v O’Neill.43  In that case, Special 
Magistrate O’Neill sued a former litigant, Dr Mann, for writing letters to the Attorney 
General, the Chief Magistrate and the Minister for Justice alleging that the plaintiff 
was unfit to hold office. The defendant argued that the letters were complaints about 
the magistrate made to relevant authorities, and should therefore be regarded as 
documents initiating proceedings to remove the magistrate from office. Since 
pleadings filed in the commencement of legal proceedings are subject to absolute 
privilege, and cannot be sued upon in defamation, it was argued that the defendant’s 
letters were privileged in the same way.44  
The plurality of the High Court rejected this argument. The court held that that the 
letters did not have the absolute privilege afforded to statements and documents in 
                                            
43 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204. 
44 Ibid 210. 
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judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,45 and that the categories of absolute privilege 
should only be expanded on the basis of necessity.46 The plurality did not consider 
Troughton but Gummow and Kirby JJ, who joined the majority in separate judgments, 
referred to it. McHugh J dissented, relying on the case to conclude that the complaint 
was protected by absolute privilege so that the magistrate had no action against the 
defendant.47 
Kirby J cited Troughton but said it was only authority for the principle that a judge 
could not sue for defamation instead of pursuing contempt proceedings where 
available. 48  Therefore it had no application to the case before him. Kirby J 
acknowledged that there was no direct authority on point.49 Therefore he resolved the 
issue in the plaintiff’s favour by looking at the scope of absolute privilege generally, 
and considering public policy arguments for and against judges suing for 
defamation.50 
Gummow J also described the ratio of Troughton to be that there was no defamation 
claim where contempt was the appropriate cause of action,51 but adverted to the 
concerns expressed by Stephen J in Troughton that: 
For a Judge to descend from his judgment seat to the floor of the Court as a 
suitor against the man with whom he dealt or could have dealt judicially, 
seems to be a denial of the majesty of the law, a forgetfulness of his high 
representative character, an abasement of the dignity of his Court and his 
prestige as a Judge.52 
                                            
45 Ibid 214-216 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
46 Ibid 213, 216. 
47 Ibid 236.  
48 Ibid 252. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 269-274. 
51 Ibid 245.  
52 Ibid 244, quoting Troughton v McIntosh (1896) 17 NSWR(L) 334, 340. 
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Gummow J took from this that there are competing interests in the case of absolute 
privilege, namely freedom to publish malicious falsehoods and the administration of 
justice (or ‘the majesty of the law’). He considered that the balance was struck by 
limiting the protection of absolute privilege to statements made in the course of 
judicial proceedings.53 By this reasoning any diminution in a judge’s capacity to 
proceed in defamation, or any increase in the scope of defences, would go too far in 
the direction of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. 
In his dissenting judgment, McHugh J held that Dr Mann’s letters were protected by 
absolute privilege. This ensured that such actions were ‘terminated from the outset.’54 
First, he held that, as per Troughton, contempt proceedings vindicating the public 
interest should be brought in such circumstances rather than a personal defamation 
suit.55 Secondly, he held that it is in the public interest that complaints against judicial 
officers be protected against defamation suits 56  even if this means unjustified 
complaints are made as well as legitimate ones.57 This strikes a different balance 
between public confidence in the administration of justice and freedom of speech to 
that propounded by Gummow J.  
Despite at least two successful defamation claims by magistrates in the previous 
decade or so,58 the defendants in O’Shane revived this issue. They argued that the 
principle from Troughton prevented the plaintiff from bringing the claim at all. From 
the defendants’ perspective, the difficulties in proving the defence of truth in respect 
of statements that the plaintiff made ‘diabolically bad decisions’ may explain resort to 
                                            
53 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 245. 
54 Ibid 236. 
55 Ibid 217. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid 229-230. 
58 The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1; John Fairfax 
Publications v O'Shane (2005) Aust Torts Rep ¶81-789. 
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this argument. It is, however, a difficult argument to make, at least on the basis of 
Troughton, given that Jones was never a litigant before the plaintiff and the 
comments were public criticism outside the context of a courtroom.   
The appeal decision 
On appeal the majority held that O’Shane was not debarred from bringing 
proceedings in defamation in respect of her judicial capacity and conduct. Beazley P, 
McColl JA and Tobias AJA concurring, held that Troughton stood only for the 
proposition that a judicial officer could not sue for defamation on comments made in 
court, because they are protected by absolute privilege.59 McColl JA separately 
agreed with the conclusion of Kirby J in Mann v O’Neill that Troughton stood for the 
proposition that a judicial officer could not pursue a defamation claim instead of 
contempt where the latter was appropriate.60  
The majority regarded Troughton as standing for a narrow proposition inapplicable to 
the case before them. In any event, they concluded that it could be distinguished. 
Beazley P and McColl JA noted that both Troughton and Mann v O’Neill involved 
suits by judicial officers against former litigants, whereas O’Shane had sued a public 
commentator.61 The majority regarded statements in Troughton to the effect that 
there was no personal right of action, even against members of the public, as obiter 
dicta.62  
Significantly, the majority held that this case was different because it was a direct and 
personal attack on the plaintiff rather than an attack on the institutional integrity of the 
                                            
59 O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 303 ALR 314, 329-330 [62] (Beazley P); 
344 [135]. 
60 Ibid 345 [138]. 
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magistracy.63 Therefore, it was unlikely that contempt proceedings could or would be 
brought.64 According to this reasoning if the plaintiff was denied the ability to bring 
defamation proceedings there would not be any appropriate control over the rights of 
defendants to publish material.65 In contrast, as discussed below, the minority opinion 
turned on characterising the defendant’s attack as going to judicial capacity and 
conduct, and therefore institutional in nature rather than only personally defamatory 
of the plaintiff.  
McColl JA separately added that denying judicial officers the right to sue for 
defamation amounted to a severe curtailment of rights that only the High Court or 
legislature could implement.66 She likened the prospect of a judge being denied the 
right to sue for defamation to suffering ‘the form of civil death applicable to those 
attainted for felony’.67 McColl JA cited Kirby J’s view in Mann v O’Neill that, though 
judges are expected to withstand public criticism, they are also citizens that should 
only be denied the right to sue for exceptionally strong reasons.68 Finally, Tobias 
AJA’s judgment added to the majority’s reasoning by responding to the public policy 
reasons advanced by the minority, so is discussed further below.  
In the minority, Basten JA, McCallum J concurring, held that because the matter 
complained of and each of the pleaded imputations related to the conduct, 
competence and capacity of the plaintiff in carrying out her functions as a judicial 
officer, she had no cause of action against the defendants in defamation.69 Basten JA 
agreed with the majority that the facts before the court were different from those in 
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Troughton and Mann v O’Neill because Alan Jones was not a former litigant before 
O’Shane.70 He also accepted that Troughton did not deal with defamatory statements 
made outside court.71 After considering the limited authorities and commentary on 
judicial defamation claims, however, Basten JA concluded that there had been ‘little 
articulation of the underlying principles’.72 
Basten JA’s minority judgment is based, not on Troughton per se, but on balancing 
the personal interests protected by a private claim for defamation and the public 
interests involved in the administration of justice. His judgment considered four public 
interests. First, the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the 
plaintiff were to attack or defend her own judgments in the defamation proceedings. 
Secondly, the independence of the judiciary, which forms an aspect of the 
administration of justice, requires judicial immunity. Thirdly, the court should be 
protected from false allegations that tend to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute, but fourthly there is a public interest in determining the truth or otherwise 
of allegations made against the court.73  
In respect of the plaintiff’s private interests, Basten JA observed that a judge’s right to 
defend his or her professional reputation does not equate with the equivalent right 
enjoyed by ordinary citizens. This, Basten JA stated, is illustrated by judicial tenure 
and immunity from suit.74 He noted that the ‘acts of the judicial officer are acts of the 
court, not the acts of an individual’.75  Therefore, he concluded that a judicial officer 
has at best a ‘derivative’ private interest in vindicating his or her judicial capacity, and 
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that this interest is already protected from governmental interference.76 Further, the 
public interest in preventing illegitimate attacks against the courts and preserving 
finality is already protected by the law of contempt.77 Basten JA did not regard the 
availability of a dual remedy as determinative.78 Instead, the factors noted above 
constituted policy reasons precluding a cause of action by a judicial officer in respect 
of his or her judicial capacity or conduct.79  
McCallum J on the appeal bench agreed with Basten JA, adding briefly that the 
plaintiff’s interest was not a private one, and that ‘vindicating the reputation of an 
individual judicial officer overlooks the institutional source of the authority to act’.80 
This accords with Basten JA’s view that an individual judge exercises the power of 
the court when acting in a judicial capacity. It is clear, as it was in Troughton, that the 
point of difference between the majority and minority is in respect of the distinction 
between the judge as an individual and the judge as an embodiment of the court.  
That the minority conclusion goes beyond the scope of the question on appeal, which 
was limited to whether Troughton prohibited the claim, is noted and criticised by 
majority judge Tobias AJA.81 Tobias AJA accepted that the four public interests 
identified by Basten JA existed, but held that they were not necessarily inconsistent 
with a judicial officer suing for defamation in respect of his or her judicial functions.82 
He agreed with the comments of Kirby J in Mann v O’Neill that various policy reasons 
were only sufficient to demonstrate why judicial officers should not sue as opposed to 
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why they may not sue.83 Along the same lines as McColl JA, and Simpson J in 
Troughton, Tobias AJA concluded that despite public policy reasons the minority 
view was ‘contrary both to experience and to authority.’84 As McColl JA had found, 
Tobias AJA concluded it was a step best left to parliament, or at the very least the 
High Court.85 Therefore the outcome on appeal in respect of the issue of Troughton 
was that the plaintiff was allowed from bringing a defamation claim against the 
defendant.  
The remaining questions regarding the complex interaction of the defence of truth 
and judicial immunity or finality, and the implied freedom of political communication, 
were resolved unanimously on the facts. In respect of judicial immunity, Beazley P 
held that it operates defensively to protect judicial officers from suit, and could not be 
used offensively to defeat the defendant’s defence of truth.86 To allow the plaintiff to 
defeat the defendant’s defence of truth by judicial immunity would ‘distort the law of 
defamation’ since she might be able to obtain damages for publication of a true 
statement.87 Basten JA considered judicial immunity, though he did not need to 
decided the point, and concluded it had no direct application to the case.88 
In the way that the defence was pleaded, that is by adopting the reasoning of the 
appeal judgments to prove errors of law, there was no abuse of process in the form 
of undermining finality either.89 In respect of decisions where misconduct but no 
errors of law were alleged, there was no impermissible interference with finality.90 
Therefore the defendants could rely on the defence of truth as pleaded, and prove 
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errors of law in seven of the plaintiff’s judgments and misconduct in another two 
judgments.  
Finally, the court considered the implied freedom of political communication. 
Question D on appeal asked whether the implied freedom was infringed if the 
principal of judicial immunity precluded the defendants from relying on the defence of 
truth. The court did not need to determine this as the defence was allowed to run and 
judicial immunity was held to have no effect on it, but Beazley P said the implied 
freedom would not cover communications criticising the judiciary. 91  The implied 
freedom only applies to communications on governmental and political matters, as 
was decided in cases such as Popovic92 and APLA.93  
Unusually, the immediate outcome of the appeal decision in O’Shane was favourable 
to both the plaintiff and defendants: the plaintiff was allowed to bring the claim, and 
the defendants’ defence of truth was not struck out. While there was certainty 
regarding these outcomes, broader areas of ambiguity emerge from this judgment 
which require further consideration.  
Unresolved issues  
At least three aspects of O’Shane point to the need to develop a coherent legal 
principle debarring claims for judicial defamation, namely one that deals with the 
plaintiff’s particular kind of reputation as a judicial officer. First, it appears that as a 
matter of practice defendants in judicial defamation claims will face difficulties in 
raising relevant defences. Secondly, there is a persistent view in favour of barring 
judges from bringing defamation suits, but this view has yet to be clarified in the form 
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of a cohesive or coherent legal rule. Thirdly, it is apparent from O’Shane that it is 
difficult to disentangle the public and private nature of a judge’s identity and rights. 
This has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding how to draw the line between the 
personal right of a judge to sue to protect their reputation as an individual, and the 
authority and integrity of the court.  
The first issue raised by O’Shane is the viability of defences to adequately protect a 
defendant in a judicial defamation claim. It is clear from the court’s position regarding 
the Lange implied freedom of political communication94 that the extended qualified 
privilege defence arising from that case will not cover communications about the 
judiciary. Absolute privilege, as was argued in Mann v O’Neill, will also not assist 
media commentators. The workability of other statutory defences in such cases have 
been previously considered by academics. 95  There is little by way of empirical 
evidence on the success of various defences in this context, but it is interesting to 
note that all the defences raised in the prior instances of magistrates suing for 
defamation – The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic96 (‘Popovic’) and John 
Fairfax Publications v O'Shane97 (‘Fairfax v O’Shane’) – failed.  
The defence of truth is critically important because the gist of the tort of defamation is 
the publication of false imputations, so, as acknowledged by Beazley P,98 it is not 
appropriate for a plaintiff to recover damages in respect of imputations that are true. 
Here, to prove the defence of truth in respect of the plaintiff making bad decisions 
Jones and Harbour Radio were fortunate to have recourse to appeal judgments, but it 
is highly unlikely that a defence of truth would be allowed to run if the defendant 
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sought to directly attack the plaintiff’s reasoning at first instance without any appeal 
decisions in their support. Beazley P accepted in obiter dicta that considerations of 
finality will preclude a direct attack on judgments to establish a defence of truth.99 
This is because it would be an abuse of process for the defendant to directly attack 
and re-litigate previous decisions of another, or possibly the same, court before 
which they appear. It is not clear how a defendant in that position could raise and 
substantiate the defence of truth, so the outcome of O’Shane is cold comfort to 
media outlets or public commentators that seek to criticise the reasoning of judges at 
first instance.  
A further difficulty in respect of proving judicial error to substantiate the defence of 
truth is that, even if successful appeal judgments can be relied upon, it is difficult to 
say how a jury ought to determine whether proof of errors in five, ten or twenty 
judgments establishes the substantial truth of imputations about being a bad judge. 
Even in respect of allegations of misconduct, the defendant may face difficulties in 
obtaining evidence of complaints made against the plaintiff by the public. When the 
defendants in O’Shane issued a subpoena on the Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales after the appeal hearing, they were only able to obtain disclosure of any 
complaints relating to the nine particularised decisions. Beech-Jones J allowed the 
Judicial Commission’s objection to the subpoena, only ordering disclosure of 
complaints relating to the nine cases which the defendants had already identified.100  
The second theme that emerges from O’Shane is that, though there is uneasiness in 
allowing judicial officers to sue for defamation, so far no clear legal principle has 
been articulated to encapsulate it. In addition to the cultural norm of restraint, there 
have been attempts to establish a policy or principle discouraging judges from suing 
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in defamation.101 Justice Young has said, for example, that there is a ‘sound theory 
that judicial officers should never sue for defamation in respect of statements made 
about them in a judicial capacity’102 and separately that such actions are ‘very much 
discouraged’.103 Similarly Justice Sackville has advocated extra-judicially for restraint, 
justified by freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary. He observed that a majority of 
judicial officers surveyed by the Australian Law Reform Commission saw ‘major 
problems’ in judges suing for defamation,104 but noted that successful claims had 
been brought before, namely those brought by Victorian magistrate Jelena Popovic in 
2003105 and O’Shane herself against Fairfax in 2005.106 
These guidelines or norms of restraint are not binding. The majority in O’Shane 
allowed the plaintiff’s defamation suit on the basis that, Troughton, properly 
understood, did not debar it. Troughton was also distinguished because Jones’ 
comments were not spoken in court, nor was he a former litigant.  On the other hand, 
Basten JA in O’Shane, and McHugh J in Mann v O’Neill, inferred a broader principle 
from Troughton to the effect that a defamation claim should never be brought by a 
judge. Basten JA looked beyond Troughton itself to have regard to relevant public 
interests to conclude that these should have priority over the private interest of the 
judge. It might be said that reliance on a policy of restraint, or consideration of public 
interests, is the minority view straining to identify a rule of law prohibiting such claims. 
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The majority in O’Shane did not dispute the merits of the public interests advanced 
for debarring such claims, but considered that a judicial officer’s ‘right’ to sue for 
defamation should not be terminated by the court on the basis of such policy 
reasoning. Much earlier in Troughton, Stephen J, who was in the majority that 
disallowed the claim, had said that ‘if… there are clear reasons of public policy 
opposed to such an action, it is only passing a line to say that what ought not be 
cannot be.’ 107  In direct contrast Simpson J, who allowed the claim, said that 
undesirability of superior judges suing was insufficient to preclude the cause of action 
and noted that ‘public policy is a restive horse, and has to be carefully ridden.’108 This 
substantially foreshadowed the same point of contention between the majority and 
minority in O’Shane.  
The third issue arising from this case is that it is difficult to separate the personal 
rights of a judicial officer and his or her role as an embodiment of the court. The heart 
of the unease associated with judicial defamation claims is that a judge, in his or her 
professional capacity, exercises judicial power and directly exercises the authority of 
the court. Unfortunately, the majority and minority decisions in O’Shane fail to clarify 
how the line should to be drawn between statements disparaging a judicial officer’s 
personal reputation and statements more broadly amounting to criticism of the court’s 
function.  
In O’Shane the minority’s decision turns on the characterisation of the defendants’ 
statements as going to judicial capacity such that any private interest of the 
magistrate is subjugated to public interests. At the same time, the majority seem to 
assume that the defendants’ statements are of a private or personal nature. Beazley 
P stated in her lead majority judgment, in the course of distinguishing Troughton, that 
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Jones’ statements were a ‘direct, personal attack on the plaintiff for allegedly making 
wrong and diabolically bad decisions’, not ‘an attack on the institutional integrity of 
the magistracy or judicial system’.109 This appears to imply that an attack on the 
institutional integrity of the judicial system would not be actionable by the magistrate, 
but it is not clear why allegations that a judge made diabolically bad decisions are not 
such an attack. Surely disputing the correctness of the magistrate’s decisions is an 
attack on the integrity of the court as well as, if not to the exclusion of, an attack on 
the individual judge’s judicial capacity. This view ignores that the majority in 
Troughton based its decision, at least in part, on the inability to extricate the 
magistrate’s personal rights from the public interest vindicated by contempt 
proceedings. 
To review, in Chapter I O’Shane and previous judicial consideration of judges suing 
for defamation have been outlined. From this it has emerged that there is a persistent 
minority view in favour of barring such claims, and clear difficulties faced by the 
defendant who criticises a member of the judiciary, but no legal principle has been 
articulated to govern the situation. In order to consider a possible solution to this, the 
simultaneous availability of public and private remedies, and the simultaneously 
institutional and personal nature of the defendant’s attack, require further 
consideration.   
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II. A proposed solution 
Chapter II proposes a way of reconceptualising the difficulties involved in judicial 
defamation through the lens of capacity to sue, specifically by proposing that a 
plaintiff should have no capacity to sue in respect of his or her ‘judicial reputation’. 
First, this chapter outlines the notion of capacity and why it is a preferred way to 
consider the problem. Secondly, the law regarding governmental reputation is 
reviewed in order to provide a basis for the analogous concept of judicial reputation. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the concept of judicial reputation is explored by 
reference to existing public policy reasoning. The relevant themes are freedom of 
speech to criticise the judiciary, the special position of judges as public officials and 
the public as opposed to private nature of the claim. Finally, the limitations and 
workability of the proposal are considered. 
The plaintiff’s capacity to sue 
Returning to first principles, defamation law must strike a balance between a 
plaintiff’s reputation and a defendant’s right to free speech.110 In light of increasing 
acknowledgement of the need to protect freedom of speech critical of the conduct 
and capacity of the judiciary, this paper suggests that the proper balance must favour 
the protection of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary can 
be adequately protected in this context by increasing the scope of defamation 
defences. The alternative is to reconsider the plaintiff’s capacity to sue in the first 
place. 
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The benefit of regarding the issue as one of capacity is that it is within the accepted 
framework of defamation. It accords with the notion that merely having a reputation 
capable of being damaged does not mean defamation law will be enforceable to 
protect it. This approach also responds to the argument that it is going too far to 
curtail a judge’s ‘right’ to sue for defamation on the basis of public policy, an 
argument advanced most clearly by McColl JA in O’Shane,111 because there is no 
universal or unlimited right to sue for defamation. 
Defamation law acknowledges that not all entities or persons can sue to protect their 
reputation. The estate of a deceased person, for example, cannot pursue a 
defamation claim in respect of the deceased.112 Only certain types of companies – 
generally speaking, small companies – can sue for defamation.113 A partnership 
cannot sue in respect of imputations that defame the individual partners in a moral 
capacity but not the partnership as a trading entity.114 The ability to sue is also 
moderated by the requirement of identification. The matter complained of must be ‘of 
and concerning’ the plaintiff,115 so the plaintiff’s ability to sue will depend on the 
particular matter complained of. Therefore, in Healy v Askin an individual 
representative of the Labor Party was not able to sue in respect of a television 
advertisement casting aspersions of communism against the Labor Party. The court 
held that the claim was not maintainable because the nature of the allegation was 
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generalised, and directed against the political views of the party, not the reputation of 
the individual plaintiff.116 
Governmental reputation 
The right to sue is also moderated because of the particular type of reputation 
impugned. Given that defamation law seeks to strike a balance between reputation 
and freedom of speech, where protection of the particular type of reputation is 
incompatible with accepted democratic principles of freedom of speech there is no 
capacity to sue. This reasoning has been applied to deny the right of governing 
bodies to sue for defamation. In New South Wales, the majority of the Court of 
Appeal held in Ballina Shire Council v Ringland117 (‘Ballina Shire Council’) that a local 
council could not maintain an action in defamation in respect of its governing or 
governmental reputation. This decision followed the, then recent, English decision of 
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd118 (‘Derbyshire’). 
In Derbyshire the House of Lords held that Derbyshire County Council was not 
entitled to sue in respect of criticisms about its investments of public money. Lord 
Keith of Kinkel, with whom the other Lords agreed, accepted that the plaintiff as an 
entity was a corporation and that ordinarily corporations can sue for defamation.119 
He reasoned, however, that as a local authority it was in a unique position, 
particularly because it was of ‘[t]he highest importance that a democratically elected 
governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited 
public criticism.’ As Gatley on Libel and Slander puts it, the decision rests ‘not upon 
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any absence of likely damage to such a body… but upon the likely chilling effect on 
free speech of granting a right of action’.120  
In Ballina Shire Council the same issue arose when the plaintiff council sued the 
defendant for publishing a press release alleging that it had covertly and unlawfully 
disposed of sewage in the sea at night and during storms. The first instance judge, 
Levine J, referred the matter to the Court of Appeal, asking whether the plaintiff being 
a council was able to maintain an action for damages for defamation. Gleeson CJ 
and Kirby P held that the council had no such right, while Mahoney JA dissented. 
The majority judges attached considerable importance to freedom of speech to 
criticise governmental institutions. Kirby P described freedom of speech as a 
‘fundamental human right’,121 noted international human rights law to that effect122 
and canvassed earlier High Court authorities confirming the emergence of the 
implied right under the Constitution.123 Gleeson CJ, in a manner similar to that of the 
court in Derbyshire, said: 
The idea of a democracy is that people are encouraged to express their 
criticisms, even their wrong-headed criticisms, of elected governmental 
institutions, in the expectation that this process will improve the quality of the 
government.124 
Freedom of speech is only the starting point, however. Gleeson CJ’s reasoning 
turned ‘upon the concept of reputation, and the nature of the reputation which the law 
of defamation sets out to protect.’ 125  He concluded that an individual’s right to 
reputation can be protected without undue interference with freedom of speech, but 
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for a government to protect its governmental reputation is incompatible with the 
process of representative democracy. 126  In a somewhat similar way, Kirby P 
considered the unique capacity of a local government authority to respond publicly to 
criticisms. Kirby P described it as misconceived for the authority to use public funds 
to sue the public body for criticising it, and observed that this could allow for serious 
abuse of power by such governmental institutions.127  
This decision rests at least partly on the nature of the governmental body as an 
elected entity. The notion of defamation law protecting governmental reputation jars 
in its application to a body which, by definition, is elected freely by citizens. This is 
illustrated by Healy v Askin, noted above in respect of identification. In this case the 
plaintiff, an endorsed candidate for the Labor Party in New South Wales, could not 
sue for defamation on an advertisement by the Liberal Party conveying imputations 
of communism against the Labor Party generally. Lee J observed that the law of 
defamation could not be used to judge the conduct of the political parties; rather, that 
was something left to be determined by electors at the time of election.128 This view, 
perhaps going further than the circumscribed view of Gleeson CJ in Ballina Shire 
Council, suggests that the appropriate venue for the determination of the plaintiff’s 
‘reputation’ is not a courtroom. Instead, in the case of a political party or 
governmental body, it is the ballot box. 
Mahoney JA’s dissenting judgment in Ballina Shire Council took issue with the 
outcome of the majority approach as leaving governmental bodies with no recourse 
to the law of defamation, even in the face of malicious or false attacks. First, he 
regarded it as unexplained why a governmental body could not sue to protect its 
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governmental reputation, but an individual vested with public power could. 129 
Secondly, Mahoney JA considered that though freedom of speech was valuable in a 
democratic society it was never without restriction.130 Defamation law, he noted, 
ought to strike the correct balance between the good and harm of freedom of speech, 
including by way of defences.131  Mahoney JA’s dissent is compelling in that it 
recognises the severity of the step taken by the majority. Nonetheless it should be 
noted that, contrary to his prediction, there has been no noted increase of malicious 
or false attacks against governmental bodies, even some twenty years later. The 
majority view in Ballina Shire Council has been subsequently affirmed.132    
Importantly, the majority in Ballina Shire Council acknowledged that there had been 
prior cases where a council had sued for defamation and no issue as to whether the 
action was maintainable was raised.133 Nonetheless, on the basis of the argument 
raised before it, the court held that the action could not be brought. By way of 
contrast, the majority in O’Shane regarded the successful claims in Popovic and 
Fairfax v O’Shane as supporting evidence that the claim could be brought.134 
Judicial reputation 
The following section applies the considerations described above to the proposed 
concept of judicial reputation. The solution proposed is that there should be no 
capacity to sue in respect of a plaintiff’s judicial reputation. By way of definition, a 
judicial officer’s judicial reputation includes that dimension of their reputation qua 
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judge. Allegations regarding judicial reasoning and relevant conduct on the bench 
would therefore be allegations going to judicial reputation.  
This concept relies on the jurisprudence in respect of governmental reputation and 
attempts to absorb and reflect the existing public policy reasons to debar defamation 
claims by judges. First, freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary is considered. This 
forms the foundation of the decisions in Derbyshire and Ballina Shire Council 
regarding governmental reputation. Secondly, the special position of judges is 
considered. This seeks to demonstrate that even as individuals judges are effectively 
public authorities, and that their capacity to sue can be denied because of the 
characteristics of judicial reputation. Thirdly, the incompatibility of defamation law 
with the public nature of the defendant’s wrong is considered.  
Freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary  
Freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary is more complicated than freedom of 
speech to criticise the government because of competing public interests. The 
biggest difficulty with any claim to freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary is that 
attacks on judges and courts are discouraged in the interests of the administration of 
justice,135 particularly where criticisms are unjustified or malicious.136 It is said that if 
reports about courts and tribunals are ‘too negative too often’ the public will lose 
confidence in the legal system.137 This reasoning forms the basis of the law of 
scandalising contempt, which punishes ‘scurrilous abuse of a judge qua judge, or of 
a court, and unwarranted attacks upon the integrity or impartiality of a judge or 
                                            
135 R v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434, 447. 
136Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238, 243. 
137Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 245.   
36 
court.’138 The law of scandalising contempt was said to be ‘virtually obsolescent’139 by 
Lord Diplock several decades ago, but there has been an acknowledged resurgence 
in its use.140 One reason that the law of scandalising contempt, which restricts 
freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary, has been questioned is that it can have 
the effect of undermining public confidence in the legal system as the ‘public 
struggles to accept why judicial officers … require a special form of protection’.141  
In the context of defamation, freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary should be 
protected. This view acknowledges the potential ‘chilling effect’142 on speech if such 
claims are allowed. There are several arguments in favour of increasing freedom of 
speech to criticise the judiciary. These are outlined below, before the scope of the 
implied freedom of communication under Lange is considered.  
First, it has been acknowledged that judges are public officials, and ought to be 
accountable to the public for their decisions. English academic Michael K Addo has 
argued, in his book Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges143 and 
elsewhere,144 that the judiciary is an organ of the government which must be subject 
                                            
138 David Eady and A T H Smith, Arlidge, Smith and Eady on Contempt (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 4th ed, 2010), 5-204.  
139 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 339. 
140 Eli Fisher, 'The Courts’ Scandal: Scandalising the courts in Australia' (2011) 16 
Media and Arts Law Review 73; Kim Gould, 'Scandalising contempt in Australia: 
Dead? Dying? In much danger? . . .(not!). . .' (2010) 15 Media and Arts Law Review 
23; Oyiela Litaba, 'Does the 'Offence' of Contempt by Scandalising the Court have a 
Valid Place in the Law of Modern Australia?' (2003) 8(1) Deakin Law Review 113; 
Mark Pearson, 'Scandalising Media Freedom: Resurrection of an Ancient Contempt' 
(2008) 14(1) Pacific Journalism Review 64; Henry Burmester, 'Scandalizing the 
Judges' (1985) 15(2) Melbourne University Law Review 313. 
141 Gould, above n 2, 609. 
142 Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
169-170, 179; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 131. 
143 Michael K Addo, Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A 
Comparative Study of European Legal Standards (Ashgate, 2000), 15-16.  
144 Michael K Addo, 'Are Judges Beyond Criticism Under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights?' (1998) 47(2) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 425. 
37 
to scrutiny and criticism in a democratic society. He argues that, in the context of a 
liberal democracy, most people would find it unacceptable that judicial accountability 
is limited to internal procedures, and observes that the work of judges is generally 
shrouded in mystery.145  
In a similar vein McHugh J in Mann v O’Neill, in dissent, adverted to the fact that it is 
desirable for complaints against the judiciary to be made without fear of lawsuit, so 
they may be properly investigated and actioned if necessary.146 This accords with the 
dissenting view of Gillard AJA in Popovic where he observed, in the context of an 
argument about qualified privilege, that: 
[t]he way [magistrates] behave in court, their fitness for office and their 
conduct as magistrates are all matters which in my view every member of the 
… community has a real and legitimate interest in knowing about.147 
Secondly, the view that courts need to enforce public silence in order to preserve 
confidence in the legal system is increasingly regarded as anachronistic. The United 
States’ position very clearly favours public debate and discussion of judicial 
decisions. Massachusetts judge Marshall CJ has said extra-judicially, for example, 
that completely unfettered criticism and commentary about the judiciary is a 
foundation of judicial independence. Even after decades of vehement criticism and 
attacks against judges, often in the context of politically charged matters such as 
Bush v Gore, she observed that the American public have retained faith in the 
system as a whole.148 Notwithstanding the vastly different constitutional framework in 
the United States, the robustness of democratic institutions in Australia should 
                                            
145 Addo, above n 143, 11.  
146 Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 230 (McHugh J).  
147 The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1, 53 [250]. 
148 Margaret H Marshall, 'Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free Speech, Judicial 
Independence, and the Rule of Law' (2002) 23(4) Sydney Law Review 455, 459-460. 
38 
similarly provide support for the view that criticism of judges, even if incorrect or 
excessive, will not seriously undermine the public’s confidence in the legal system.149  
Thirdly, the work of judges is often inherently political in nature. Canadian Judge 
Beverley McLachlin, now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, has 
said, for example, that judicial lawmaking increasingly invades ‘the domain of social 
policy, formerly the exclusive right of Parliament and the legislature’.150 Similarly Sir 
Gerard Brennan observed that ‘[i]t would be absurd to suggest that the Mabo, Wik 
and Ha and Hammond judgments of the High Court could not and should not be 
subject to critical examination.’151 In a related context Andrew Kenyon has argued 
that qualified privilege in Australia should be extended to cover political matters more 
generally.152   
Finally, the traditional view that freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary must be 
limited because judges are unable to respond to that criticism has been worn down. 
In R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, for example, Lord Denning had said, ‘[a]ll 
we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our 
office, we cannot reply to their criticisms.’153 As Lord Kilmuir famously said, ‘so long 
as a judge keeps silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality remains 
                                            
149 Sackville, above n 104,199-201. 
150 The Hon Beverley McLachlin, 'The Role of Judges in Modern Commonwealth 
Society' (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 260, 262, quoted in Addo, above n 143, 
15 and David Kosař, Freedom of Speech and Permissible Degree of Criticism of 
Judges (LLM Thesis, Central European University, 2007) 
<www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/kosar_david.pdf >, 11. 
151 Gerard Brennan, 'The State of the Judicature' (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 
33, 39. 
152 Andrew Kenyon, 'Defamation and Critique: Political Speech and New York Times 
v Sullivan in Australia and England' (2001) 25(2) Melbourne University Law Review 
522. 
153 R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner: Ex parte Blackburn (No 2) [1968] 2 All ER 
319, 320. 
39 
unassailable’.154 According to this view, a judge must not enter into the fray of public 
discussion about his or her decisions or political controversies generally.155 As a 
matter of practice, however, judges do enter into public debate,156 and perhaps in 
light of increasingly common and hostile criticism of judicial officers157 some form of 
response is necessary. As pointed out by Justice Sackville and Kim Gould, it has 
become increasingly difficult to justify the archetype of a ‘remote and silent’ 
judiciary.158  
It is somewhat difficult to chart the appropriate scope of freedom of speech to criticise 
the judiciary, because the arguments tend to involve unsubstantiated assertions 
about what is in the public interest. On the one hand it might be said that the 
prospect of judges suing for defamation undermines public confidence in the 
administration of justice, because such suits can create the appearance of the 
partiality.159 Perhaps a real-life example of this is Richard Ackland’s opinion of the 
O’Shane decision itself, entitled ‘Judges should stay on the bench and keep off the 
playing field’. 160  Equally, however, it could be argued that false accusations of 
corruption or incompetence destabilise the same public confidence, and that judges 
should sue to correct these misapprehensions. 161  There is a lack of empirical 
evidence on these issues,162 and persuasive statements either way. For the purpose 
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of this paper it is sufficient to observe that current protections of freedom of speech to 
criticise the judiciary are limited, but without adequate justification. 
By way of comparison, speech critical of the other arms of government is relatively 
well protected in Australia. The differential treatment of judges is problematic. In the 
formative case of Lange the High Court held that the provisions of the Constitution 
requiring democratic election of government necessarily implied freedom of 
communication in order to facilitate a free and properly informed electoral decision.163  
As discussed above, this freedom does not extend to criticisms of the judiciary. At its 
highest McHugh J in APLA 164 and Winnecke ACJ in Popovic 165 said that 
communications concerning the judiciary might be protected if they amount to 
comment on the executive’s failure to remove the judicial officer. That the court in 
O’Shane determined that Jones’ comments were not communications on government 
or political matters166 reflects a gap in the protection afforded by the implied freedom. 
Notwithstanding the textual constraints of the Constitution, the carving out of the 
judiciary from public commentary and criticism is difficult to justify as a matter of 
principle.167 It is not without reason that there has been expression in academic 
commentary of a possibility that the implied freedom could be expanded to cover 
comments on judicial conduct.168  
Attempts in litigation to extend the implied freedom to cover communications 
criticising judges, by way of the common law qualified privilege defence, have also 
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failed. In Popovic the majority rejected the argument that qualified privilege, relying 
on the Lange definition of implied freedom of communication on government and 
political matters, extended to the judiciary.169 Only Gillard AJA, dissenting, accepted 
the argument on the basis that members of the judiciary were sufficiently connected 
to the government.170 Later, in Fairfax v O’Shane counsel for Fairfax, Bret Walker 
SC, submitted that the extended Lange qualified privilege defence should be 
understood as covering communications about the judiciary.171 In the alternative he 
argued that there should be a qualified privilege analogous to the extended Lange 
qualified privilege. 172  The latter argument was based on the need for public 
discussion about legal decisions and the airing of criticisms about judges failing to do 
their jobs.173 This proposed defence was rejected by the court. Young CJ in Eq 
opined that though the appellant’s arguments were elegantly put, and may have 
reflected ‘sound wisdom’, they were contrary to authority.174 
It is difficult to pursue much further the argument that the Lange implied freedom of 
communication should be extended to protect communications critical of the 
judiciary. Because the implied freedom is based on those sections of the 
constitutional text requiring direct election of government, and the judiciary is 
independent from the government of the day, it is likely that it cannot be extended in 
this way. At least in the context of the defence of qualified privilege, arguments in 
favour of extension have been repeatedly rejected. The purpose of outlining these 
arguments, however, is to illustrate the unique treatment which judges receive. There 
is no protection of communications criticising the judiciary under the implied freedom 
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of political communication, even though the judiciary is appointed by, funded by, and 
applies the laws of the government.  
In considering freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary in the context of ‘judicial 
reputation’, it is submitted that a more general principle of freedom of speech should 
form its basis. It is not necessary to rely on the Lange implied freedom; Ballina Shire 
Council was decided in relation to governmental reputation before the implied 
freedom was properly developed. Instead, as outlined earlier, within the context of 
defamation law there are reasons to protect freedom of speech to criticise the 
judiciary which render judicial reputation incompatible with it.   
The special position of a judge 
In addition to freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary a concept of judicial 
reputation requires consideration of the unique role played by judicial officers in 
relation to members of the public, who could be defendants in a defamation claim 
brought by such officers. This adapts the consideration in respect of governmental 
reputation regarding the nature of governmental bodies.  
The starting point is that judges are not ordinary professionals. They are unlike 
doctors or builders who can sue in defamation to protect their professional or 
commercial reputation. In one sense, O’Shane’s claim was brought to defend her 
professional capability. However as Basten JA observed in O’Shane, generally 
judges cannot suffer pecuniary harm because of damage to their professional 
reputation, nor be removed easily.175 Since judges are individuals in a hierarchical 
institution created by the state, and dispense public power, there are apprehensions 
in respect of defamation claims to protect their reputation.  
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One difficulty in the proposed concept of judicial reputation is that it denies 
individuals the capacity to sue for defamation, whereas in cases concerning 
governmental reputation courts seem to offer consolation by way of observing that 
individual representatives of the government remain entitled to sue for defamation, 
even if the government body cannot. The decisions in Ballina Shire Council and 
Derbyshire acknowledged that though the plaintiff council could not sue for 
defamation, individual councillors were entitled to if they were defamed by what the 
defendant published.176 That this is a potential inconsistency was noted by Mahoney 
JA, dissenting in Ballina Shire Council, when he observed that the exemption from 
defamation depends on ‘the accident of whether the power in question was vested in 
a body or an individual.’177 Clearly, it has never been argued, much less accepted, 
that a court as an entity could sue for defamation, only that individual judges can do 
so. Nonetheless, because judges occupy a special position, wherein they directly and 
personally dispense the judicial power of the state, it is submitted that this incursion 
on any individual ‘right’ to sue can be made.  
Judicial officers are in an extremely unique position with respect to public power; 
when an individual judge sits on the bench, he or she embodies the court. Unlike an 
individual in a representative body, such as a councillor, who may not have any 
‘governing reputation’ of his or her own, a judicial officer has the same judicial 
reputation as the court which they constitute. The subsuming of personal identity into 
the institutional role was of critical concern to the minority in O’Shane, though it was 
not framed by a concept of judicial reputation. McCallum J noted pithily in O’Shane 
that ‘[t]he functions of a court are not personal to the judicial officers who exercise the 
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court’s jurisdiction.’ Basten JA similarly observed in his consideration of public and 
private interests that: 
The acts of the judicial officer are the acts of the court, not the acts of an 
individual; the judge is not a party to any appeal; judicial review of orders 
made is properly brought against the court or tribunal, not against the judicial 
officer who made the orders…178 
Much earlier in Troughton, Stephen J illustrated the difficulty of a judge suing for 
defamation, in respect of aspersions cast against them in the capacity of a judge, by 
considering the hypothetical scenario of more than one judge constituting the bench:  
If two Justices had formed the Court, certainly as a Court no action could be 
brought. Could they have maintained one jointly for the aspersion upon their 
administration of justice? It seems to me clearly not. Could they then have 
maintained one separately for the particular loss of character which each may 
be supposed to have sustained? Again, in my opinion, no.179 
The notion that an individual personally exercising public power effectively embodies 
a public authority, and must forgo their personal reputation to do so, is acknowledged 
in the ‘public official’ doctrine in the United States. According to the seminal case of 
New York Times v Sullivan – which marks its 50th anniversary this year, no less – to 
pursue a claim in defamation public officials must establish that the defendant 
published the statement knowing, or in reckless disregard as to, its falsity.180 This 
reverses the presumption of falsity in defamation, and makes it markedly more 
difficult for a public official to sue. 
It is difficult to import these requirements into Australian law, given the vastly different 
development of defamation law and constitutionally enshrined freedom of speech in 
the United States. When an argument was made in Theophanous to that effect, the 
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majority of the High Court rejected it.181 New York Times v Sullivan is nonetheless 
relevant because, as noted by academic Robert Post, this decision has the effect of 
preventing defamation law from transmuting ‘impersonal government criticism’ into 
personal criticism of government officials. 182  It therefore supports the view that 
judicial reputation, necessarily involving the personal exercise of public power, 
cannot be the subject of a defamation claim. This reasoning reflects the view of 
McHugh J in Mann v O’Neill that a judicial officer’s suit against a former litigant is 
‘incompatible’ with judicial office.183 It also incorporates the concerns Basten JA 
expressed in O’Shane in forming the view that any personal, ‘derivative’ interest the 
plaintiff had to sue was trumped by public interests.184 
The public nature of the wrong 
Governmental reputation cannot be protected by defamation because value 
judgments relating to the elected body are best determined by the electoral process 
by virtue of which it exists. In a similar way it can be argued that the law of 
defamation cannot protect ‘judicial reputation’ when the real interest, the authority of 
the court, is determined by the public in a democracy that respects the court and is 
adequately protected by the law of scandalising contempt. 
One aspect of the decision in Ballina Shire Council was that it was incompatible with 
the democratic election of the plaintiff body for it to sue to protect a governmental 
reputation. Judges are not elected, so the view that the plaintiff and defendant’s 
dispute should be dealt with in the format of a democratic election, rather than a 
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defamation suit, does not apply. Instead, the incompatibility of a defamation suit with 
the plaintiff’s reputation as a judge can be demonstrated by acknowledging the 
public, rather than private, nature of the issue through the law of scandalising 
contempt. 
Scandalising the court is a form of contempt making it an offence to commit an act or 
publish words ‘calculated to bring the court or a judge of the court into contempt or to 
lower his authority.’185 Unlike contempt sub judice, the impugned words or actions 
need not be directed at proceedings that are ongoing or any particular proceeding at 
all.186 Australian examples include a disparaging and sarcastic editorial suggesting 
the High Court wantonly destructed the effect of legislation187 and comments by a 
prominent union official implying influence over a decision of the Full Federal 
Court.188 The existence or sufficiency of the law of scandalising contempt has been 
previously regarded as an explanation for judicial restraint in suing for defamation. As 
discussed in Chapter I, Stephen J in Troughton objected to the availability of a ‘dual 
remedy’, namely one in contempt for vindicating the public interest and one in 
defamation giving rise to personal reparations.189  
With respect to the present proposal the argument put forward is not that the 
availability of two remedies is untenable, but that a concept of judicial reputation in 
defamation accepts the public nature of the defendant’s wrong as already forming the 
subject of the law of scandalising contempt. Therefore, as issues of governmental 
reputation are best determined by public discussion and election, issues of judicial 
reputation are best dealt with by the law of contempt.  
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In his dissenting judgment in Mann v O’Neill McHugh J followed Troughton to 
conclude that ‘where it is necessary to deal with a person who scurrilously abuses a 
judicial officer, that should be done by enforcing the public law of contempt or 
scandalising the court, not by a private action for damages.’190 In O’Shane the 
majority did not accept this reasoning. Beazley P noted that from a practical point of 
view contempt proceedings could not be brought years later by the plaintiff, nor were 
they likely to be brought by the Attorney General against Jones.191 McHugh J’s 
argument, however, is a broader one. In accordance with Stephen J’s comment in 
Troughton that, even if the contempt was passed over in silence, the defamation 
claim could not be brought192 McHugh J’s view was that the mere availability, not the 
exercise, of the power of contempt made the defamation action not maintainable.193 
As one commentator put it, that contempt proceedings could be brought illustrates 
the public rather than the private nature of the issue.194   
Judicial reputation in context 
The notion of judicial reputation, being one that a plaintiff cannot sue to protect, is not 
without its limitations. First, as a matter of law, it is not directly adaptable from the 
jurisprudence with respect to governmental reputations. The preceding section has 
attempted to address those difficulties, and it is submitted that this framework is at 
least a useful starting point to incorporate the public policy objections and culture of 
restraint that already exist in order to formulate a legal rule about judges suing for 
defamation. 
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Secondly, it must be accepted that barring all judges from suing in respect of their 
judicial reputation is not a small step to take, even if scandalising contempt can be 
used to deal with particularly dangerous or severe criticisms. It should be noted that it 
is not desirable to encourage prosecutions in contempt instead of proceedings by 
way of civil redress.195 Scandalising contempt, however, clearly requires a much 
higher threshold to be pursued as compared to defamation, and should continue to 
be used in rare cases in the interests of freedom of speech. There will be cases 
where the defendant’s statements are capable of being defamatory but are not of a 
kind that would be prosecuted for scandalising the court. If so, the judge’s personal 
capacity to sue is precluded.  
At the same time, the content of judicial reputation is open to consideration. In 
O’Shane, for example, allegations about making diabolically bad decisions attacked 
the plaintiff’s judicial reasoning, but perhaps if a narrower definition of judicial 
reputation is taken more outlandish comments can still be sued on. Finally, 
alternative modes of response, such as increased participation by judges in public 
life, and means of communications such as court media officers,196 should not be 
ignored. This could allow for non-litigious dialogue to correct misapprehensions or 
incorrect statements made by the public. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter I, O’Shane was reviewed. The difficulties in that case emerged initially 
because of Jones and Harbour Radio’s defence of truth, which involved an attempt to 
attack Magistrate O’Shane’s judgments from years earlier. The Court of Appeal had 
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little authority with which to determine the claim, but identified that there was no rule 
preventing a judge from suing a member of the public for defamation. The minority 
decision turned on the institutional nature of the defendant’s criticisms, since they 
attacked the plaintiff’s judicial capacity and conduct, whereas the majority assumed it 
to be a personal attack.  
In Chapter II, a refocusing was proposed. By considering capacity to sue and the 
nature of the reputation to be defended, it was suggested that defamation law should 
not acknowledge judicial reputation as the proper subject of a claim. Borrowing from 
the existing jurisprudence in respect of governmental reputation, it was argued that 
freedom of speech to criticise the judiciary should be preserved. To this end, existing 
public policy reasoning was incorporated to explain why a suit for defamation is 
incompatible with the plaintiff’s reputation as a judge. It is suggested that this way of 
approaching the problem appropriately incorporates the minority’s concerns in 
O’Shane, but does so through the concept of reputation in defamation law rather than 
public interests taking precedence over private interests.  
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